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Policy makers need a conception of linguistic disadvantage to supply guidance about 
the relative priority of inequalities with a linguistic dimension and to inform decisions 
about whether such inequalities require correction or compensation. A satisfactory 
conception of linguistic disadvantage will make it possible to compare the situations of 
speakers of different languages and to assess the normative significance of a range of 
linguistic inequalities. This paper evaluates four rival conceptions and asks whether 
they satisfy these criteria. Respectively, these conceptions associate linguistic 
disadvantage with inadequate communicative opportunities, with being unable to do the 
things that one cares about, with lacking (access to) important resources, and with 
capability deprivation. It is argued that a conception of linguistic disadvantage derived 











Because linguistic environments reward different language repertoires unequally, 
speakers of different languages can be advantaged or disadvantaged depending on how 
their language repertoire ‘fits’ with their linguistic environment. In this paper I explore 
four different accounts about when it might be appropriate to describe an individual or 
group as experiencing linguistic disadvantage: because they have inadequate 
communicative opportunities; because they cannot do the things they care about; 
because they lack (access to) important resources; or because they are deprived of the 
capability to achieve important human functionings. Ultimately, I argue that the final 
option is the most promising, and that a person suffers linguistic disadvantage within a 
given linguistic environment when for linguistic reasons she lacks the effective freedom 
to do and be particular things that are valuable or worthwhile. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, I discuss a range of linguistic 
inequalities. These inequalities are defined not by their type but by their source, and 
each arises because linguistic environments inevitably reward different language 
repertoires to greater and lesser extents. Second, I argue that policy makers will need a 
single conception of linguistic disadvantage if they are to implement public policies to 
address linguistic inequalities. This conception should enable us to both compare the 
situations of speakers of different languages and to evaluate the normative significance 
of linguistic inequalities against other social, economic and political inequalities.  Third, 
I explore four such conceptions, and argue that one based on the capabilities approach is 




Linguistic Inequalities  
The forms of advantage and disadvantage addressed in this paper arise because 
linguistic environments reward different language repertoires unequally. A ‘linguistic 
environment’ refers to the ‘linguistic dimensions of the surroundings in which people 
live’ and consists in the ‘sum total’ of a society’s ‘demolinguistic and sociolinguistic 
features’ (Grin 2003, 178). Thus, it includes the different languages that are used in a 
space, the number of speakers they have, the extent to which they are recognised by 
official institutions and within civil society, the different statuses they have, and the 
different functions they are used for.1 Meanwhile, a ‘language repertoire’ refers to the 
range of languages an individual person can speak, read, understand and write, as well 
as their various competences in these respective activities.  
Linguistic environments inevitably confer advantages on people who are highly 
competent users of particular languages, such as those which are widely spoken or used 
for official business. Correspondingly, they disadvantage those who are less competent 
in such languages, and perhaps also those who prefer to use a minority language. 
Moreover, alterations in a linguistic environment may improve or worsen a person’s 
prospects, for instance by increasing or decreasing the availability of employment 
opportunities, or by symbolically affirming the value of their identity. Thus, people’s 
lives are heavily influenced by the way in which their language repertoire ‘fits’ the 
linguistic environment they inhabit.  
                                                          
1 A linguistic environment is an analytical construct that can be applied to many different domains, 
including most obviously nation-states, but also to smaller territories like regions and cities, as well as to 
larger ones like the European Union. Linguistic environments need not be territorially defined, and in 
some circumstances it might be helpful to refer to the linguistic environment of particular industries, 




There are a number of different ways in which a linguistic environment might 
give rise to linguistic inequalities. Perhaps the most widely studied of these are the 
different employment prospects available to people because of their linguistic 
competences (see, e.g., Albouy 2008; Bleakley & Chin 2004; Chiswick & Miller 1995, 
1998, 2007, 2010; Chiswick & Taengnoi 2007; Di Paolo & Raymond 2012; Fry & 
Lowell 2003; Kossoudji 1988; Stöhr 2015; Toomet 2011). Every linguistic environment 
benefits job seekers who can speak particular languages, including both official 
languages and the lingua franca. Sometimes this is because familiarity with a locally 
dominant language is a requirement for holding particular kinds of positions (such as 
jobs that require communicating with the public), and sometimes it is because particular 
jobs are reserved for native speakers of particular languages, as is sometimes the case in 
the educational, publishing and translation sectors.  
The content of an employee’s language repertoire may also influence her 
prospects for promotion. For example, people who are less familiar with the language 
used within an organisation may appear hesitant or indecisive, or they may come across 
as less personable or competent, and their achievements and abilities may be 
overlooked. Moreover, even when a worker is highly proficient in the primary language 
used in an organisation, her language repertoire could still influence her career 
advancement, if competence in additional languages is rewarded or required, as is often 
the case in multinational corporations and international organisations, as well in the 
education and hospitality sectors.  
Empirical studies suggest that the connection between language repertoire and 
wages is quite complex. A number of studies have focussed on immigrant labour market 
performance. Here, it has been found that majority language competence in general is 
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associated with increased earnings, and that more proficient majority language users 
tend to earn more than less proficient majority language users. For example, a recent 
survey of country-specific studies concludes that ‘dominant language proficiency 
among immigrants is rewarded rather handsomely around the globe’ (Chiswick and 
Miller 2014, 243). However, this picture is complicated by at least two things. First, the 
connections between majority language competence and earnings may be stronger in 
some employment fields than in others. For example, Berman, Lang and Siniver (2000) 
found that software specialists and technicians in Israel benefited from learning Hebrew, 
but that construction workers and gas attendants did not. Second, at least in some cases 
the connections between majority language competence and earnings may also be 
influenced by gender. For example, Yao and van Ours (2015) found that whilst female 
immigrants in Holland with poor Dutch language skills earned less than their 
counterparts with strong Dutch language skills, this relation did not hold for male 
immigrants.  
The influence of supplementary language learning on labour market 
performance is similarly complex. In Anglophone countries, the premium for speaking 
another language in addition to English has been found to be low (Fry & Lowell 2003; 
Saiz & Zoido 2005). Meanwhile, knowledge of English often attracts generous returns 
in countries where it is not an official language. For example, Grin (2001) has found 
that fluency in English amongst French- and German-speaking men in Switzerland is 
associated with higher earnings, and similar results have also been found in Germany 
(Stöhr 2015) and Israel (Lang & Siniver 2009). Strikingly, one recent study found that 
Russian-speakers in Estonia and Lativa received better returns from learning English 
than from learning the official languages (Toomet 2011). Meanwhile, the benefits of 
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learning another official language in bi- or multilingual societies vary considerably. In 
Canada, for example, Anglophones receive only a modest benefit for learning French in 
Quebec, and no benefit at all in the other provinces (Albouy 2008). By contrast 
employees in Catalonia with knowledge of Catalan earn 18% more than those without 
(Di Paolo & Raymond 2012).  
Outside the sphere of employment, familiarity with a widely-used language can 
attract other direct and indirect economic benefits. For instance, a direct benefit accrued 
by some speakers of privileged languages is the competitive advantage it potentially 
confers within particular domains, such as the ‘cultural industries’. One example of this 
is the emergence of a global publishing industry, in which books published in English 
not only have a wider ‘ready-made’ audience than books published in most other 
languages, but are also more likely to be translated into other languages (Van Parijs 
2011, 94). Meanwhile, an indirect economic benefit of familiarity with a privileged 
language is that it can provide its speakers with more opportunities to access advantage 
conferring institutions, such as universities and career networks. Similarly, being able to 
efficiently navigate social, commercial and public institutions can indirectly benefit 
speakers of privileged languages by reducing or eliminating a variety of transaction 
costs, or by allowing people to make more efficient consumption decisions.    
As well as these economic benefits, particular language competences can also 
confer non-material advantages (see De Schutter and Ypi 2012). For example, the 
content of a person’s language repertoire may influence their opportunities to form 
friendships and relationships, to access medical care and other emergency services, to 
engage with official and commercial institutions, to negotiate complex social 
environments, or to effectively exercise their social and political rights. Thus, speakers 
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of privileged languages, because they can communicate with others more efficiently, 
may turn out not only to be wealthier than their linguistically disadvantaged peers, but 
also to be more secure, better able to form meaningful relationships and more 
empowered.2  
 
Linguistic Disadvantage and Public Policy 
As this brief survey indicates, there are numerous ways in which having a particular 
language repertoire can advantage or disadvantage someone within a given linguistic 
environment. However, there is no self-evident way to rank these different inequalities 
according to their normative significance, and people who experience them may have 
contrasting preferences about which are of greater or lesser importance. For example, 
some people might experience unequal access to political influence as the most 
important linguistic inequality, others might feel that unequal employment prospects are 
more important, and still others might worry more about the costs of social isolation. 
This raises a puzzle about whether it is possible to compare different people with 
different preferences and different language skills according to their overall level of 
linguistic advantage or disadvantage. Performing such comparisons is important, since 
unless we can do so it is difficult to see how we might normatively evaluate proposed 
                                                          
2 In addition to all of these inequalities, some political theorists argue that the public standing of one’s 
ancestral language, and especially whether it is officially recognised, can also be an important linguistic 
inequality (see, e.g., Patten 2014). This might be because languages are an important part of our cultural 
structures, which supply us with a ‘context of choice’ that makes personal autonomy possible (Kymlicka 
1989, 1995). On this view, people who lack a stable linguistic environment in which their ancestral 
language has a secure position are less likely to be capable of making meaningful choices than people 
whose primary language is afforded public recognition and support. Another related argument is that 
the public visibility of one’s language is an important form of public recognition, and that people whose 
linguistic identities are routinely ignored by public institutions or misrecognised by them are less likely 
to secure adequate dignity or self-respect (Taylor 1994). I do not directly address these inequalities in 
this paper.  
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language policies according to their anticipated effects. For instance, unless we can 
form assessments of someone’s overall level of linguistic advantage or disadvantage, 
we will not be able to tell whether an alteration in their linguistic environment or to 
their language repertoire will improve or worsen their situation.  
The importance of having a single standard for comparing the situations of 
people with different language repertoires can be illustrated by considering the 
following pair of examples. First, suppose that a multilingual society proposes to 
introduce English as a second language in the school system. Because it will replace a 
minority official language in this role, this policy can reasonably be anticipated to have 
the following two effects: people who would be otherwise unlikely to gain mastery of 
English will be able to access employment opportunities that would otherwise be 
unavailable to them; and speakers of the minority language that was previously taught 
as a second language will have fewer opportunities to use that language in both formal 
and informal settings. Unless we can compare these different gains and losses, and the 
others to which the policy might give rise, it will be impossible to reach a considered 
judgement about whether the policy ought to be recommended.  
Second, suppose that a largely monolingual society is contemplating introducing 
subsidies for majority-language learning programmes, targeting immigrants who are not 
proficient in that language. Unlike the previous policy, the future earnings gains this 
policy is likely to generate for immigrants will almost certainly offset any future losses 
for other groups (such as majority language speakers who will lose some of their 
competitive advantage in the labour market). However, because the policy itself will 
introduce new costs, both for participants who are required to invest in language 
learning and for whoever is required to subsidise the programmes, in order to know 
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whether such a policy is to be recommended we will need to know the severity of 
linguistic disadvantage currently experienced by immigrants. For example, if 
immigrants who are not competent in the majority language already have adequate 
employment and social opportunities available to them, then perhaps the policy will not 
be justified.  
There are numerous other contexts in which policymakers may find it beneficial 
to have a standardised means to allow them to compare how well people with different 
language competences fare within a particular linguistic environment. In order to make 
decisions about whether addressing some particular linguistic inequality is a priority, 
they will also need some way to determine how significant a particular linguistic 
inequality actually is. Combining these things together suggests that policy makers need 
a ‘metric’ of linguistic disadvantage and that it ought to satisfy two criteria. First, it 
should provide a common standard for comparing the situations of people with different 
language repertoires. Second, it should also provide a common standard for comparing 
inequalities with a linguistic dimension against other social, economic and political 
inequalities.  
It is worth emphasising that any particular metric does not, as such, imply any 
normative conclusions about how or whether particular inequalities ought to be 
addressed, and that making decisions about these things will require additional 
normative principles, which I do not discuss here. Certainly, it seems likely that many 
linguistic inequalities are justifiable, both from the perspective of justice itself and from 
the perspective of what we ought to do, all things considered. On the one hand, some 
linguistic inequalities are probably neither unfair nor unjust, since they are produced by 
choices for which individuals ought to be held responsible, such as decisions about 
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supplementary language learning. On the other hand, some linguistic inequalities 
probably cannot be ameliorated, at least not without imposing excessively burdensome 
costs, such as the disadvantages experienced by voluntary and temporary migrants with 
respect to navigating their social environment. 
Thus, a complete normative account of what to do about linguistic inequality 
will need to combine three things: an account of what kinds of linguistic inequalities 
matter; a means for comparing these inequalities to other ones; and an account about 
when linguistic inequalities demand redress. This paper addresses only the first and 
second of these challenges, and not the third. Proceeding in this way seems sensible, 
since we need to understand linguistic disadvantage itself before we can make 
principled decisions about how it ought to be distributed.  Hence, in the remaining parts 
of this paper I set out four rival conceptions of linguistic disadvantage and evaluate 
them according to the criteria specified above. These metrics specify which dimensions 
of a person’s situation are relevant for the purposes of comparing how they are faring, 
and they yield different verdicts about whether particular language repertoires are 
advantageous or disadvantageous in a given linguistic environment.   
 
Inadequate Opportunities for Communication  
According to the first conception, a person suffers linguistic disadvantage when they 
have inadequate opportunities for communication, because within their linguistic 
environment they are only able to communicate without mediation amongst a relatively 
(or absolutely) small number of people. The rationale for this view is straightforward: a 
language repertoire that equips its holder to communicate with more people is clearly 
11 
 
advantageous in at least one respect by comparison with a language repertoire that 
equips its holder to communicate with fewer people. For example, a monolingual 
immigrant who cannot speak the most widely used language in his society experiences 
linguistic disadvantage in this sense, and this disadvantage will be lessened if he learns 
the majority language (or if other people learn his language). Of course, whether or not 
a language repertoire is disadvantageous depends on the linguistic environment at stake. 
A monolingual Dutch speaker may have relatively few potential communication 
partners in Italy, but not in the Low Countries.  
One feature of this conception of linguistic disadvantage is that it treats a 
person’s language repertoire as a resource, the value of which depends on the languages 
that other people speak within their linguistic environment. As such, people will qualify 
as linguistically disadvantaged either when their language repertoire has a relatively low 
value, or when its value falls beneath some threshold. Different strategies might be 
employed to compute the value of a language repertoire. One approach is to calculate 
the sum of potential communication partners a person has available to them, and then to 
rank different language repertoires according to whether they include languages with 
greater or lesser proportions of speakers. Thus, the more prevalent the languages in a 
repertoire, the less the linguistic disadvantage.  However, comparing language 
repertoires according to the sheer number of communicative partners available to 
someone might undervalue some languages and some language repertoires. For 
example, knowledge of a former colonial language in a newly independent state is often 
highly prized, and more so than knowledge of more widely known languages, if it 
provides its speakers with access to high status employment opportunities. Thus, Abram 
de Swaan instead recommends computing the value of a language repertoire by 
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combining the prevalence of the languages it contains with their centrality, whereby 
centrality is understood in terms of the proportion of multilingual speakers who are 
familiar with at least one of the languages in the repertoire. This approach delivers a ‘Q-
value’, which can serve as a ‘rough-and-ready measure’ for the ‘communication value’ 
of either a language or a language repertoire in a particular linguistic environment (de 
Swaan 2001, 39). 
Just as there are different ways to compute the communication value of a 
language repertoire, there are different ways to assess whether or not a language 
repertoire qualifies as disadvantageous on this approach. On the one hand, we might 
rank each language repertoire in a given linguistic environment on a single scale, and 
designate those which deliver a less than average communication value as 
disadvantageous. Thus, a person will qualify as linguistically disadvantaged if she can 
communicate with fewer people than the average member of their society can, or if the 
Q-value of her language repertoire is less than the average Q-value. On the other hand, 
we might instead identify an absolute threshold. As such, a person might qualify as 
linguistically disadvantaged if she can communicate with fewer than 20% (say) of the 
members of her society, or if the Q-value of her language repertoire falls beneath some 
specified figure.   
Regardless of how it is formulated, this approach can only deliver a partial and 
limited understanding of linguistic disadvantage, and it has two main shortcomings. The 
first arises because it assumes that all communicative opportunities are equally valuable, 
and that languages (or language repertoires) are more valuable if they supply speakers 
with more communicative opportunities. However, having fewer communicative 
opportunities might not always be disadvantageous, since some communicative 
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opportunities are more important than others. For example, suppose that we compare a 
variety of different language repertoires according to the proportion of communicative 
partners each speaker has available to them (that is to say, according to the prevalence 
of the languages within each person’s repertoire). Someone whose repertoire has a 
relatively low score might nevertheless have an adequate range of educational and 
employment prospects. Furthermore, their employment prospects might dramatically 
improve without the languages in their repertoire becoming more prevalent (for 
instance, as a result of changing recruitment practices by multinational firms). In cases 
like these, even if having relatively few potential communicative partners is a form of 
disadvantage, it seems counter-intuitive to say that it is normatively significant. 
Moreover, incorporating the centrality of the languages within a repertoire does not 
solve this problem, since knowledge of a language that is spoken by multilinguals does 
not necessarily correlate with improved circumstances. Often, of course, people whose 
language repertoires have a higher Q-value will be advantaged by comparison with 
people whose language repertoires have a lower Q-value. However, it is not Q-value (or 
prevalence) as such that is normatively significant, but rather what a language repertoire 
equips its holder to be, do or get within their linguistic environment.    
The second shortcoming is that this approach is unable to provide a common 
standard for comparing inequalities with a linguistic dimension to other social, 
economic and political inequalities. Consequently, it may obscure the ways in which 
inequalities with a linguistic dimension intersect with other inequalities. For example, 
imagine a society with two main language groups, and where bilingual university 
graduates earn more, on average, than monolingual graduates. Although bilinguals fare 
better than monolinguals overall in this society, bilingual high-school graduates receive 
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similar wages to monolingual high-school graduates, and both groups tend to earn 
considerably less than monolingual university graduates. Thus, a language repertoire 
with a high Q-value delivers a wage premium only for people with university degrees. 
No doubt it still makes sense to say that in this society bilinguals are advantaged by 
comparison with monolinguals, but a conception of linguistic disadvantage that focuses 
solely on the range of potential communicative partners a person has available to them 
will obscure much of the normatively salient detail in a situation like this.  
 
Unsatisfied Preferences  
The second conception of linguistic disadvantage asks about the extent to which a 
person’s own preferences are satisfied within their linguistic environment. Earlier we 
saw that people might have different views about which linguistic inequalities are more 
or less significant – some might be more concerned about diminished political influence 
whilst others might be more concerned about the costs of social isolation, for example. 
Rather than treating disagreements like these as a problem, we might instead say that a 
person is linguistically disadvantaged when they are unable – for linguistic reasons – to 
do the things they care about, or to achieve the outcomes they value. Thus, for example, 
whether a migrant with poor employment prospects qualifies as linguistically 
disadvantaged will depend on their own preferences about occupational choice. 
Similarly, the members of a linguistic minority who are prevented from using their own 
language when communicating with public officials will qualify as linguistically 
disadvantaged if and only if this is something that they themselves care about. 
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One attraction of this approach is that it reflects variations in the salience of 
different language issues both between and within language communities. This is 
something that some normative theories of language policy have already sought to 
incorporate. For example, David Laitin and Rob Reich (2003) argue that it would be 
rash to assume that all members of a linguistic minority favour official recognition or 
language promotion policies. Thus, they suggest that (most) decisions about language 
policy ought to be settled democratically, since cultural, social and political action can 
reveal the intensity of people’s preferences about languages. Unlike Laitin and Reich’s 
proposal, however, the view under consideration does not incorporate a procedure 
through which people reveal their preferences. Instead, it assumes that we already know 
what people’s preferences are, and then uses this information to identify the extent and 
distribution of linguistic disadvantage.  
In addition to incorporating information about individual preferences, this 
approach also seems to satisfy the two desiderata mentioned earlier. First, it allows for 
the comparison of people on the basis of their language repertoires. Noticeably, and in 
contrast to the first conception, this approach disallows comparisons of groups defined 
by their linguistic abilities, since group members might have contrasting preferences. 
For example, some minority language speakers might attach a high priority to being 
able to find rewarding employment in their ancestral language, whilst others may not. 
Instead, this approach insists that the units of comparison are individuals themselves. 
Thus, it ranks each member of a society according to the extent to which their 
preferences are satisfied, and picks out those who are disadvantaged by reference to 
their position in the overall ranking. Second, this approach also allows us to compare 
inequalities with a linguistic dimension against other social, economic and political 
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inequalities. This is because we can compare cases in which people’s preferences are 
unsatisfied for linguistic reasons against those in which their preferences are unsatisfied 
for other reasons. Thus, it might deliver the conclusion that the members of an ethnic 
minority are more disadvantaged by an underfunded school system than by the absence 
of official language rights, if it turns out to be the case that the former is responsible for 
a greater number of unsatisfied preferences than the latter.   
Despite these merits, this approach is vulnerable to at least two serious 
objections. First is the problem of external preferences, which are preferences about 
how goods and opportunities ought to be assigned to others (Dworkin 1977, 234-6). 
Members of a majority language group, for example, might have a strong preference 
that only their language be granted official recognition, and that people not be permitted 
to use other languages in public institutions. According to the current conception, and 
counter-intuitively, a policy of official bilingualism could be a source of linguistic 
disadvantage for the members of this group, even if it had no serious impact on the 
opportunities and resources available to them. Second is the problem of adaptive 
preferences, in which people willingly accept limited opportunities, often as a result of 
internalising the values implicit in their oppression (Sen 1992, 55). For example, 
suppose that an immigrant with poor majority language skills accepts their own limited 
employment prospects, and does not prefer greater occupational choices. On the current 
conception, the immigrant does not qualify as linguistically disadvantaged, and policies 





Diminished Access to Resources 
The third conception of linguistic disadvantage asks about what a language repertoire 
equips a person to ‘get’ within a linguistic environment. According to this view, a 
person is linguistically disadvantaged within a given linguistic environment either when 
her language repertoire enables her to get fewer external resources than average, or 
when it enables her to get less than some absolute threshold of external resources. For 
example, someone whose employment opportunities are sharply curtailed because of 
her limited familiarity with the majority language will qualify as linguistically 
disadvantaged on this view, whilst someone with rare and highly marketable language 
skills will likely qualify as linguistically advantaged.  
This conception of linguistic disadvantage is strongly intuitive. Not only was it 
implicit in some of the criticisms already registered against the first conception, but it is 
also the view assumed by many economic analyses of inequalities with a linguistic 
dimension, such as those which explore the labour market performance of groups 
defined by their language skills. Although wage inequalities are clearly an important 
linguistic inequality, they are not the only resource whose distribution is influenced by 
linguistic factors. For example, speakers of high-prestige languages are often 
advantaged in competition for political office, and people familiar with official 
languages often experience reduced transaction costs when accessing public services. 
Consequently, this metric of linguistic disadvantage will require two things. First, a 
means for selecting the resources whose distribution ought to be assessed when making 
judgements about linguistic disadvantage. Second, a mechanism for ranking inequalities 
in those different resources, so as to make it possible to compare unequal access to, say, 
cultural products with unequal access to political office. 
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Two different strategies might be employed to satisfy these desiderata. On the 
one hand, we might compare different language repertoires according to whether they 
equip people to access a specified range of resources, selected and ranked on the basis 
of their objective value. On the other hand, we might instead select and rank resources 
procedurally, without making any assumptions about the objective value of particular 
resources. In the end, as we shall see, both options face similar difficulties. 
Nevertheless, it is worth spelling each alternative out in order to establish the variety of 
ways to assess the distribution of linguistic advantage according to people’s access to 
resources.  
To begin, suppose that we base our metric on an objective ranking of resources, 
such as by adopting or modifying John Rawls’s list of social primary goods. These are 
flexible, transferable and multipurpose goods that free and equal citizens would agree 
are important, in the sense that it would be rational to prefer a greater share of them. 
Rawls’s list includes the basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement and free 
choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities, the powers and 
prerogatives of offices and positions of authority, income and wealth, and the ‘social 
bases of self-respect’ (Rawls 2001, 58-9). These goods seem suitable for our purposes, 
since linguistic environments influence their distribution, in the sense that people are 
likely to have greater or lesser shares of them depending on their language repertoires. 
For example, and all other things being equal, the linguistic environments of both India 
and the European Union offer those who speak English wider occupational choices than 
those who do not, since many administrative posts require English-language 
competence. Likewise, and as we have seen, most linguistic environments offer 
economic rewards for speakers of particular languages, such as majority languages, 
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official languages and the lingua franca. Additionally, many political communities also 
privilege native speakers of official languages when it comes to allocating political 
office, either through informal mechanisms such as voter discrimination or through 
formal rules (as in Belgium, for example, where candidates for the European Parliament 
must be competent in the language of the constituency).  
Any objective approach, and not just the Rawlsian one, must make 
(controversial) assumptions about which resource inequalities matter and about how to 
rank the comparative importance of different resources. The second strategy avoids this 
by instead designing a neutral procedure to select and rank the resources that are to be 
compared. One way to do this would be to employ something like Ronald Dworkin’s 
hypothetical insurance scheme (Dworkin 2000, 73-83). Here, we first find out what 
people would be willing to pay in order to purchase insurance against being deprived of 
particular resources. In turn, this exercise will reveal which resources are, as a matter of 
fact, highly prized in a particular society, and this will allow us to rank different 
resources according to their significance. Finally, equipped with this list, we can go out 
and compare people’s actual situations. On this approach, being unable to access 
resources that are highly valued by your fellow citizens will count for more than being 
unable to access less widely sought after resources. Thus, unlike the objective approach, 
whether or not a particular linguistic inequality matters will depend on the beliefs and 
preferences of your fellow citizens.  
One difficulty raised by both approaches concerns the comparison of 
inequalities in the distribution of different resources. As we saw earlier, being able to 
rank linguistic disadvantage on a single overall scale is highly desirable, since otherwise 
it will be difficult to tell whether an alteration in a linguistic environment improves or 
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worsens someone’s overall position. However, some philosophers who embrace 
resourcism endorse pluralism, implying that inequalities in different kinds of goods 
cannot be reduced to a single scale or to one another (Rawls 1999, 36-40; see also Wolff 
& De-Shalit 2007, 23 & 31-4). If they are right, then having a greater share of one 
resource (such as money) cannot be directly compared with having a lesser share of 
another resource (such as occupational choice). This problem afflicts both the objective 
and procedural strategies, since it implies that although people can have rational 
grounds for preferring A to B, they cannot rationally compare gaining 100 units of B to 
gaining 10 units of A. So, in the case of the procedural strategy, even if people did 
express a preference about the latter during the course of purchasing a hypothetical 
insurance package, that preference would lack a rational basis.  
Even if pluralism is true, such that inequalities in one resource-domain cannot be 
compared to inequalities in another resource-domain, there might nevertheless be both 
objective and procedural grounds for believing that some resources, as such, are more 
significant than others. This, roughly speaking, describes Rawls’s view, who allocated 
different weightings to different resources. For example, his favoured normative theory 
of ‘justice as fairness’ attached ‘lexical’ priority to the basic rights and liberties, 
stipulating that each person ought to have as much of this primary good as is consistent 
with everyone else having an equal share. At the same time, his theory was more 
permissive about inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth, since it assumed 
that these resources were less significant than the basic rights and liberties (Rawls 1999, 
52-6 & 78-81). A procedural approach to ranking different resources might likewise 
arrive at a similar conclusion, albeit for different reasons.   
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Attaching different weights to different resources will certainly help when it 
comes to establishing an overall ranking of linguistic disadvantage. For instance, if we 
accept Rawls’s ranking, then inequalities arising from direct discrimination will qualify 
as normatively weightier than those arising from the reward structure of fair 
employment markets. Furthermore, inequalities that involve deprivations in more than 
one resource or in a weightier resource will become visible. For example, suppose that 
X and Y both currently fare badly because their linguistic environment offers few 
employment prospects to people with their language repertoires: in X’s case because her 
language repertoire does not include the official language, in Y’s case because she is 
part of a stigmatised minority who regularly suffer employment discrimination. 
Although both have similarly small shares of one resource (income and wealth), Y also 
lacks another (basic rights and liberties), and (according to the Rawlsian ranking) is 
worse-off overall.  
However, if pluralism is true, then we will be unable to make the kinds of fine-
grained comparisons that are necessary to comprehensively assess changes in linguistic 
environments. For example, suppose that over time, Y comes to earn more than X, 
despite still facing discrimination. If we say that basic rights and liberties always matter 
more than income and wealth, then Y will continue to fare worse than X overall, 
however much she earns, since the resource she lacks is ‘weightier’ than the one X 
lacks. With respect to a resource like basic rights and liberties, this may well be true, for 
instance because it would never be rational for Y to accept improved employment 
prospects as compensation for the persistence of direct discrimination. However, 
amongst other resources it might indeed be rational to accept trade-offs like these, and it 
is the possibility of establishing when these would be rational that pluralism rejects.  
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Meanwhile, even if pluralism is not true, both objective and procedural 
strategies are vulnerable to a further objection, which is that diminished access to 
resources might be too narrow a way of construing linguistic disadvantage, because 
some inequalities with a linguistic dimension are not about resources in the first place. It 
is important not to exaggerate this objection, since inequalities that seem not to be about 
resources often are, if resources are construed in a broad enough way. For example, 
consider inequalities in the distribution of political influence, such as when people who 
are less familiar with dominant language(s) are less effective participants in democratic 
politics. This is describable as a resource inequality, since the current operation of the 
linguistic environment ensures that some people receive less value or worth from their 
political freedoms. Similarly, consider welfare, symbolic and cultural inequalities that 
have a linguistic dimension, such as when people suffer social isolation as a result of 
having limited communicative opportunities, or when someone’s linguistic identity is 
afforded lesser symbolic recognition than comparable linguistic identities. These too are 
arguably describable as resource inequalities, if they cause people to lack confidence in 
the value of their own plans and projects, or in their capacity to pursue and fulfil their 
goals, since then they would constitute deprivations with respect to what Rawls 
describes as the most important primary good – the social bases of self-respect (Rawls 
1999, 440-5).  
However, some inequalities with a linguistic dimension are more difficult to 
account for in this way. These include inequalities amongst people who, for linguistic 
reasons, are differently situated when it comes to achieving particular outcomes. For 
example, consider a society in which no one is prevented from accessing medical care, 
because translation services are provided where necessary. From the perspective of the 
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resourcist approach, the provision of translation ensures that everyone has access to the 
valued resource at stake. However, speakers of minority languages might nevertheless 
find it more difficult to secure good health, since they lack an option available to 
majority language speakers – i.e. to access the service in their L1. They do not lack the 
resource of medical care itself, but rather the linguistic environment diminishes their 
effective opportunity to realise a particular outcome.  
 
Capability Deprivation   
The fourth conception of linguistic disadvantage compares people not according to what 
their language repertoire equips them to get in a given linguistic environment, but 
according to what it equips them to be and do. According to this view, a person suffers 
linguistic disadvantage when for linguistic reasons they are unable to function in a fully 
human way. This conception applies the capability approach, originally suggested by 
Amartya Sen (1980, 1992, 2009) and developed by Martha Nussbaum (1990, 1992, 
1999, 2011), both of whom proposed comparing people’s situations by looking at their 
capabilities to function in particular ways. A functioning is what a person can do or be. 
More specifically, it is a valuable activity or a state of being that is constitutive of well-
being. Functionings might be simple (such as being nourished, literate or healthy) or 
more complex (such as being happy, being in good health, having self-respect or 
participating in social life). In turn, a capability is the ability to achieve a functioning, or 
a combination of functionings. Thus, capabilities are sometimes described as ‘real’ or 
‘substantive’ freedoms, since a person has the capability to do or be something only if 
he is effectively able to do so. For example, a person might lack the capability to 
24 
 
achieve the functioning of affiliating with others because he cannot afford socially 
appropriate clothing. Or, he might lack the capability to achieve the functioning of 
being in good health because he lacks access to adequate medical care. Meanwhile, if 
social arrangements were adapted, giving him the real opportunity achieve these things, 
he would come to possess freedoms he previously lacked.  
The most basic difference between this approach and the previous ones is that it 
proceeds by comparing people’s effective abilities rather than what they have. As such, 
it incorporates the insight that people might be disadvantaged not only because they 
lack particular resources, but also because of the operation of social norms or the 
influence of environmental factors. As Nussbaum summarises the view: 
We ask not only about the person’s satisfaction with what she does, but about 
what she does, and what she is in a position to do (what her opportunities and 
liberties are). And we ask not just about the resources that are sitting around, but 
about how those do or do not go to work, enabling [the person] to function in a 
fully human way. (Nussbaum 2000, 71)   
Nussbaum (2011, 17-45) uses the term ‘combined capabilities’ to capture the sense in 
which a person’s ‘substantive’ freedom consists in a combination of their ‘internal 
capabilities’ and the political, social and economic environment. On her account, a 
person has a ‘combined capability’ to do or be X if they have the internal capability to 
do or be X and if there are no social, political or economic circumstances that impede or 
prevent them from doing or being X. Here, ‘internal capabilities’ refer to a person’s 
trained or developed traits and abilities, such as their skills and dispositions, including 
their language repertoire. A person might have highly sophisticated ‘internal 
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capabilities’, but lack the effective opportunity to employ them. For example, someone 
might be ‘internally capable’ of free speech, but lack the opportunity to practice it if she 
lives in a repressive society.  Meanwhile, someone might live in a society that upholds 
the right to free speech, but lack the ‘internal capability’ to think critically or to speak 
publicly about political affairs. In either case, she lacks an effective freedom, and this 
can be captured by saying that she is deprived of an important capability. 
When applied to the identification and measurement of linguistic disadvantage, 
the capability approach draws attention to the ways in which linguistic environments 
combine with language repertoires to deprive people of the effective ability to achieve 
particular (and valuable) outcomes. For example, take the functioning of being in good 
health. For the capability theorist, what matters is not simply having good health, but 
being substantively free to achieve it, which means having the ‘combined capability’ to 
do so. In turn, this requires not only having access to the necessary external resources, 
but also have the effective ability to take full advantage of those resources, which - as 
we saw – may be compromised if someone is unable to access medical services in a 
language she is comfortable with. Similarly, a person might have a diminished 
capability to use her senses, thought and imagination in a fully human way if she is 
unable to experience literary and musical works in a language she is intimately familiar 
with.  Or, her capability to form and maintain relationships with others might be 
compromised if she cannot effectively communicate her hopes and fears with other 
people.  
It would be arduous and perhaps impossible to evaluate a linguistic environment 
by trying to identify every respect in which it frustrates a person’s real freedom to do or 
be particular things. Moreover, such an exercise would be normatively fruitless, since at 
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any given time even the most disadvantaged individual will likely have the capability to 
achieve a wide variety of functionings. Fortunately, capability theorists do not believe 
that all functionings are equally valuable, and they emphasise the importance of 
particular functionings, focussing on those which are essential for living a truly human 
life (Sen 1992, 44-6). Although Sen (2005, 158) refuses to set out a complete list of 
functionings, Nussbaum (2011, 33-4) has proposed a list of ten central capabilities, 
which she thinks are essential ingredients of a dignified human life. These include 
things such as being able to have good health, being able to move freely without risk of 
violence, being able to use one’s senses and imagination, being able to have emotional 
attachments, being able to form and revise one’s life plan, being able to care for others, 
being able to play and enjoy recreational activities, being able to participate effectively 
in political decision-making, and being able to enjoy meaningful employment. 
Although Nussbaum’s own list of capabilities has attracted controversy (Alkire 
2002; Claassen 2011; Sen 2004), something like it will be required if this conception of 
linguistic disadvantage is to satisfy the two desiderata stipulated earlier. This is because 
unless we can compare people according to their freedoms to achieve a specified list of 
functionings, it will be impossible to tell whether one language repertoire impairs 
people to a greater or lesser extent than another, or whether capability deprivations that 
are the result of linguistic factors are more or less serious than other capability 
deprivations. Once a list is in place, the idea of linguistic disadvantage as capability 
deprivation might be understood in one of two ways. Either we say that a person is 
linguistically disadvantaged when they have the capability to achieve fewer of the listed 
functionings than the average member of their society, or we can use a list of 
functionings to specify a threshold that establishes a social minimum, such that 
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someone qualifies as linguistically disadvantaged if for linguistic reasons they lack the 
capability to achieve any of the identified functionings.  
 Both alternatives are vulnerable to a worry similar to one previously directed at 
the resourcist view, namely that the different functionings might be incommensurable. 
As such, even if we know that one person lacks the capability to achieve functioning A 
(but not B), and that another lacks the capability to achieve functioning B (but not A), 
we might be unable to say who is worse-off overall. This problem is magnified if we 
also accept that with respect to at least some functionings, people can be impaired to 
greater and lesser extents. So, for example, someone’s capability to achieve the 
functioning of enjoying meaningful employment might be better or more secure than 
someone else’s, even though neither entirely lacks the relevant capability.  
 Although these difficulties are serious, they do not fatally undermine this 
approach to measuring linguistic disadvantage. One strategy for dealing with them is to 
say that the capability to achieve a particular functioning ought to be understood in 
terms of meeting an adequacy threshold (Nussbaum 2006, 291-4). This would allow us 
to take each functioning in turn and establish whether linguistic circumstances 
contribute to depriving a person of the capability to achieve it. The results of this 
exercise will not establish the overall distribution of linguistic disadvantage, since 
incommensurability implies that we cannot know whether being unable to achieve the 
functioings of P and Q is better or worse than being unable to achieve the functioning of 
R. However, it would allow us to compare people’s linguistic situations in a rough-and-
ready way. Moreover, since people are compared according to their ability to achieve 
specified functionings, this approach would also ensure that inequalities with a 
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linguistic dimension are compared on a common basis with other social, economic and 
political inequalities.  
 Suppose, then, that the capability approach to measuring and identifying 
linguistic disadvantage survives the pluralism objection. It might nevertheless be 
objected that the approach itself is redundant, since capability deprivation with a 
linguistic dimension nearly always arises either because a person’s ancestral language is 
not widely used, or because their language repertoire does not include a locally 
dominant language. For example, deprivation in the capability to engage with cultural 
products in one’s native language is typically experienced by people whose ancestral 
language is not widely used, and deprivation in the capability to interact socially is often 
experienced by people whose language repertoire has a low Q-value, such as 
immigrants. Thus, the capability deprivation conception of linguistic disadvantage 
might be rejected on the grounds that it does not tell us anything that the first 
conception did not. 
 However, although the prevalence and centrality of the languages within a 
person’s repertoire can explain some forms of linguistic disadvantage, it is not these 
things as such that matter. This can be illustrated by considering cases in which 
capability deprivation can be satisfactorily addressed without adjusting the Q-value or 
the prevalence of the languages within a person’s repertoire. For example, suppose that 
an elderly immigrant cannot access medical services using a language she understands 
and is instead forced to rely on the goodwill of her friends and family to translate 
medical advice for her, which she finds embarrassing and which compromises her 
independence. Although she currently lacks an important capability because her 
language repertoire has a low Q-value, her disadvantage could be addressed by altering 
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her linguistic environment and without increasing the communicative value of her 
repertoire, for instance through the public provision of translation services or a public 
listing of family doctors in her region who can speak her language.  
 Similarly, consider a minority language which for some reason has relatively 
few cultural products. Few novels are published in it, no radio or television programmes 
are broadcast in it, and artists prefer to use other languages since they get better returns 
by doing so. Speakers of this language arguably experience a capability deprivation, 
since they cannot exercise their senses and imaginations in a language they are 
intimately familiar with. Again, however, although this capability deprivation arises 
because the language has a low-Q value, it might be satisfactorily addressed by altering 
the linguistic environment and without increasing the Q-value of that language, for 
instance through the public provision of minority language arts broadcasting, or by 
harnessing web-based technologies. 
 A puzzle raised by this approach to measuring linguistic disadvantage concerns 
whether ‘verbal independence’ qualifies as a distinct functioning. This has been 
proposed by Wolff and De-Shalit, who define it as ‘the functioning of being able to 
communicate, including being able to speak [and understand] the local language’ (2007, 
60; see also 50). In support of this, they discuss a range of cases in which people are 
disadvantaged because they are not verbally independent, such as Russian-speaking 
alcoholics in Israel who were unable to participate in courses to curb their addictions, 
and immigrant parents who were unable to negotiate complex bureaucracies to get their 
children into better schools. However, although not being verbally independent is 
frequently a source of disadvantage and may undermine a person’s ability to live in a 
fully human way, it is unnecessary to treat it as a separate functioning. Whilst verbal 
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independence often is a condition for having the capability to achieve some other 
important functionings, it is never a necessary condition, since in theory at least people 
could achieve all of the other functionings without it. Thus, it might be better to say that 
lacking verbal indepdence can (and often is) a source of disadvantage, but is not itself a 
form of disadvantage. 
 
Conclusion 
Linguistic disadvantage is a pervasive feature of linguistically diverse environments. It 
arises because linguistic environments inevitably reward different language repertoires 
unequally, and it cannot be entirely eradicated, at least not without erasing language 
differences themselves. In order to know when linguistic inequalities demand attention, 
we need an account of which inequalities with a linguistic dimension have normative 
priority. Furthermore, such an account will enable us to normatively evaluate proposed 
language policies according to their anticipated effects, helping us to see whether an 
alteration in someone’s linguistic environment will improve or worsen their situation. 
However, formulating such an account is a challenging task, since people have different 
preferences, causing them to disagree about which linguistic inequalities matter. 
As this paper has demonstrated, policy makers might identify and measure the 
normatively salient properties of linguistic disadvantage in four different ways. The first 
treats a person’s language repertoire as a resource, whose value depends on the 
language skills of others. Conceiving of linguistic disadvantage in this way suggests that 
it ought to be addressed by adjusting people’s language repertoires, so as to increase the 
communicative value an individual receives from their language repertoire. This is 
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unsatisfactory, however, since some forms of linguistic disadvantage can be corrected 
with requiring people to learn additional languages. The second approach instead 
focuses on how satisfied people are with their linguistic environments, and says that 
people suffer greater linguistic disadvantage according to the extent to which they are 
unable to do things they care about for linguistic reasons. This approach suggests that 
linguistic disadvantage ought to be addressed either by altering the content of people’s 
language repertoires or by removing barriers in their linguistic environments. Although 
this approach is preferable to the first one, it is nevertheless vulnerable to some of the 
standard objections to using preferences for measuring welfare.  
The third and fourth approaches are more promising. The third equates linguistic 
disadvantage with diminished access to resources, and recommends comparing different 
language repertoires according to the share of external resources their holders have 
access to. Meanwhile, the fourth focuses on what a language repertoire equips a person 
to be and do within a given linguistic environment, and equates linguistic disadvantage 
with capability deprivation. As should hopefully be clear from the preceding analysis, 
the fourth conception of linguistic disadvantage will capture a wider range of linguistic 
inequalities than the third. This is arguably an attractive implication, since linguistic 
environments can deprive people of capabilities even when they equip them with an 
equal (or adequate, or fair) share of resources. For example, a linguistic environment 
might not disadvantage an immigrant labourer with only limited fluency in the majority 
language when it comes to securing employment, but it may do so when it comes to 
participating in politics, accessing medical services, exercising their imagination or 
senses, or forming and maintaining relationships with others. Indeed, people might be 
unable to achieve a variety of functionings despite having adequate opportunities for 
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employment and without having any reasonable grounds for complaining about their 
share of primary goods. Thus, provided that a satisfactory list of capabilities can be 
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